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STATEMEI\JT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cody Parmer was charged with rape, with both statutory and forcible rape 
charges as alternate theories of the offense. Following a jury trial, Mr. Parmer was 
convicted of battery with the intent to commit rape. He timely appeals from his 
judgment of conviction and sentence, and asserts that the prosecutor in this case 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct in the cross-examination of a defense witness that 
requires reversal of his conviction. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Cody Parmer was charged with rape and battery with the intent to commit rape. 
(R., pp.60-61.) The State charged two alternative theories of rape within its Information 
- both forcible rape and statutory rape. (R., pp.60-61.) 
At trial, the State presented the testimony of S.H.'s mother, Loretta Gladish. 
(Trial Tr.1, p.186, Ls.7-25.) Ms. Gladish testified that S.H.'s birthdate was
(Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.1-4.) On the night of the alleged rape, Ms. Gladish was 
travelling in Montana, but she came home early the next morning after receiving a 
phone call from S.H. (Trial Tr., p.188, L.4 - p.189, L.24.) Upon arriving, Ms. Gladish 
went to Kootenai Medical center where S.H. was present in the emergency room. (Trial 
Tr., p.190, L.7 p.191, L.1.) According to Ms. Gladish's testimony, S.H. appeared to be 
1 The record on appeal in this case contains multiple volumes of transcripts of 
proceedings. For ease of reference, citations made to the primary volume of 
transcripts, which contains the trial transcript along with the transcripts of several other 
hearings, is referred to herein as 'Trial Tr." All other citations to the transcripts of 
proceedings are made in accordance with the date of the proceeding transcribed. 
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upset and crying. (Trial Tr., p.191, Ls.14-16.) There were also bite marks on S.H.'s 
body that were not present on the previous day. (Trial Tr., 192, L.2 - p.195, L.16.) 
Next, the State presented the testimony of Kari Hydorn, a friend of S.H. who also 
attended vocational training with her. (Trial Tr., p.199, L.21 - p.200, L.18.) Ms. Hydorn 
testified that, on the morning of April 8, 2010, she received a call from S.H. who relayed 
that something had happened to her and she needed Ms. Hydorn to give her a ride. 
(Trial Tr., p.201, Ls.4-21.) In response to this call, Ms. Hydorn and her boyfriend got 
dressed and walked down the road to meet S.H. (Trial Tr., p.202, Ls.4-11.) 
Despite the cold weather, S.H. was dressed only in a tee shirt and shorts, and 
was sitting beneath the awning of a store overhang. (Trial Tr., p.202, L.12 - p.203, 
L.14.) Ms. Hydorn brought S.H. back to her home, gave her shoes and socks, and 
asked S.H. whether she wanted to go to the hospital. (Trial Tr., p.203, Ls.15-24.) S.H. 
refused to go to the hospital at the time and left Ms. Hydorn's house. (Trial Tr., p.203, 
Ls.23-24.) Ms. Hydorn also testified that, during the time S. H. was at her house, she 
observed blood on S.H.'s underwear while she was changing clothes. (Trial Tr., p.209, 
Ls.2-21.) 
Following this testimony, the State called Misty Delaney-Huff to the stand. (Trial 
Tr., p.211,L.24 - p.212, L.11.) Ms. Delaney-Huff was another of S.H.'s friends, and was 
the next person that S.H. called on the morning of April 8. (Trial Tr., p.212, L.24 -
p.214, L.4.) After calling Ms. Delaney-Huff early that morning, S.H. arrived at 
Ms. Delaney-Huff's home looking distraught. (Trial Tr., p.214, Ls.14-23.) After talking 
for approximately 15 minutes, Ms. Delaney-Huff drove S.H. to the hospital. (Trial 
Tr., p.215, Ls.3-7.) According to Ms. Delaney-Huff's testimony, S.H.'s demeanor 
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alternated between crying, acting angry, and falling into non-responsiveness. (Trial 
Tr., p.215, L.24-p.216, L.4.) 
S.H. testified next for the State. (Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.2-6.) She first testified that, 
prior to the night of the alleged rape, she was familiar with one of Mr. Parmer's friends, 
Amanda Seeling, although she did not know Mr. Parmer prior to that night. (Trial 
Tr., p.219, L.18 - p.221, L.22.) Earlier that day, S.H. had seen Ms. Seeling at a local 
mall with Mr. Parmer. (Trial Tr., p.220, L.20 - p.221, L.10.) Later that same day, S.H. 
and Ms. Seeling exchanged texts and made plans to hang out at Ms. Seeling and 
Mr. Parmer's house that night. (Trial Tr., p.221, L.25 - p.222, L.9.) S.H. went over to 
Mr. Parmer's house at around ten that evening. (Trial Tr., p.222, Ls.10-11.) 
When S.H. arrived, Ms. Seeling, Mr. Parmer, and another man named Levi 
Bornschein2 were at the house. (Trial Tr., p.222, L.23 - p.223, L.5.) At some point that 
night, everyone went to a downstairs basement bedroom to play cards, listen to music, 
and drink alcohol. (Trial Tr., p.223, L.12 - p.225, L.7.) Eventually S.H., Ms. Seeling, 
Mr. Parmer, and Levi started to dance to the music that was playing. (Trial Tr., p.229, 
Ls.16-19.) 
While everyone was dancing, according to S.H.'s testimony, Mr. Parmer 
attempted to put his hands down her pants and to bite her neck. (Trial Tr., p.232, Ls.7-
21.) S.H. testified that both she and Ms. Seeling told Mr. Parmer to stop. (Trial 
Tr., p.232, Ls.15-17.) According to her testimony, Mr. Parmer bit down sufficiently hard 
to cause her pain. (Trial Tr., p.233, Ls.7-8.) S.H. testified that she then decided to lay 
2 Although S.H. was unable to identify Mr. Bornschein's last name, the jury was 
provided with this information through Ms. Seeling's subsequent testimony. (See Trial 
Tr., p.580, L.22.) 
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down on the bed in the downstairs bedroom because her stomach was upset. (Trial 
Tr., p.233, Ls.12-19.) 
Shortly after S.H. laid down on the bed, Ms. Seeling joined her, and Mr. Parmer 
subsequently did as well. (Trial Tr., p.234, L.15 - p.235, L.3.) After a time, according to 
S.H.'s testimony, Ms. Seeling got out of bed and went upstairs. (Trial Tr., p.235, Ls.15-
18.) S.H. testified that she and Mr. Parmer remained downstairs in bed. (Trial 
Tr., p.235, L.22 - p.236, L.1.) 
S.H. claimed that, once Ms. Seeling left the room, Mr. Parmer rolled on top of 
her, put ~1is hands down her pants, and attempted to take off her shorts. (Trial 
Tr., p.236, Ls.17-23.) She also testified that Mr. Parmer inserted his penis in her 
vagina, at which point she told him to stop. (Trial Tr., p.236, Ls.17-23.) S.H. further 
claimed that Mr. Parmer was repeatedly biting her in an attempt to overcome her 
protests. (Trial Tr., p.236, Ls.17-23.) S.H. claimed that Mr. Parmer had one leg 
between hers and his other leg across her other side at the time. (Trial Tr., p.237, L.22 
- p.238, L.4.) According to her testimony, she both verbally and repeatedly told 
Mr. Parmer to stop, as well as physically attempted to dislodge him by pushing against 
him with her hands and shoulder. (Trial Tr., p.238, Ls.12-24.) 
According to S.H.'s testimony, Mr. Parmer eventually got off of her, at which point 
she grabbed her backpack and ran out of the home without bothering to put any shoes 
on. (Trial Tr., p.240, L.22 - p.241, L.4.) She then called her friend, Ms. Hydorn, to pick 
her up, who subsequently took S.H. to another friend's home. (Trial Tr., p.241, Ls.5-
19.) S.H. thereafter went to the hospital. (Trial Tr., p.241, Ls.22-24.) 
When asked about a series of bite marks that were photographic exhibits at trial, 
S.H. identified Mr. Parmer as the person who had bit her. (Trial Tr., p.242, L.5 - p.244, 
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L.23.) S.H. admitted that, when confronted by police investigating whether she had 
been raped, she had not been truthful with regard to her having consumed alcohol. 
(Trial Tr., p.244, L.24 - p.245, L.5.) However, she claimed that she only lied to the 
officer about this fact because she was too young to legally consume alcohol and did 
not want to get in trouble. (Trial Tr., p.245, Ls.6-15.) S.H. testified that she later 
admitted to have been drinking to police. (Trial Tr., p.245, Ls.12-15.) 
On cross-examination, S.H. admitted that Mr. Parmer had previously put his 
hands down her pants while they were dancing, but that she made no attempt to leave, 
nor did she try to leave when Mr. Parmer initially tried to put his hands down her pants 
when they were laying down on Ms. Seeling's bed later that night. (Trial Tr., p.288, 
Ls.4-25.) S.H. further admitted that she never called out for help during the alleged 
rape, despite the fact that Mr. Bornschein was downstairs on a couch that was only six 
feet away and Ms. Seeling was right upstairs. (Trial Tr., p.290, L.20 - p.292, L.9.) Nor 
did S.H. go with Ms. Seeling upstairs instead of remaining with Mr. Parmer in bed. 
(Trial Tr., p.289, Ls.4-24.) 
After S.H.'s testimony, the State called Officer Greg Moore, of the Coeur d'Alene 
police department, to the stand. (Trial Tr., p.305, Ls.8-13.) Officer Moore responded to 
Kootenai Medical Center upon a report of a possible sexual assault. (Trial Tr, p.306, 
L.17 - p.307, L.8.) Upon talking to S.H., the officer believed her demeanor to be 
reserved and possibly frightened. (Trial Tr., p.308, L.13 - p.309, L.9.) The officer also 
took some pictures of S.H. (Trial Tr., p.309, Ls.7-9.) These pictures were of bite marks 
that the officer saw on S.H.'s body. (Trial Tr., p.310, Ls.2-5.) 
From the hospital, Officer Moore then left for Mr. Parmer's house along with two 
other officers. (Trial Tr., p.310, L.6 - p.311, L.10.) One of Mr. Parmer's roommates 
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answered the door and allowed the officers inside. (Trial Tr., p.311, Ls.11-22.) Officer 
Moore first spoke with Ms. Seeling, then went downstairs to photograph the basement 
and take several items from the basement area. (Trial Tr., p.312, .) Next, the 
officer spoke with Mr. Parmer on the front steps of the house. (Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.10-
13.) The State introduced a recording of the officer's interrogation of Mr. Parmer while 
on the front steps of Mr. Parmer's house. (Trial Tr., p.314, L.11 - p.320, L.6; State's Ex. 
3A.) During this conversation, Mr. Parmer admitted to having bitten S.H. on the neck, 
and acknowledged that it was possible that he had "made out" with her while he was 
drunk, but flatly denied that the two had had sex. (State's Ex. 3A.) 
After this interrogation, Mr. Parmer was placed under arrest and was initially 
being transported to jail. (Trial Tr., p.321, Ls.14-17.) But while on the way, Officer 
Moore changed his mind and took Mr. Parmer to be questioned again by another 
officer. (Trial Tr., p.321, L.23 p.322, L.3.) After dropping Mr. Parmer off to be 
questioned, Officer Moore then returned to the hospital to retrieve the rape kit 
performed on S.H. (Trial Tr., p.324, Ls.18-23.) 
The detective who subsequently interrogated Mr. Parmer, Detective Tracy 
Martin, testified next for the State. (Trial Tr., p.338, Ls.11-16.) The digital video 
recording of the interrogation, along with Mr. Parmer's sworn statement obtained by the 
detective, were admitted into evidence. (Trial Tr., p.342, L.2 - p.344, L.3; State's Ex. 
4A, 4B.) Additionally, Detective Martin testified that he obtained swabs of Mr. Parmer's 
inner cheek and penis that were voluntarily provided by Mr. Parmer. (Trial Tr., p.349, 
L.15 - p.351, L.22.) 
The emergency room physician who attended S.H. during the rape kit, 
Dr. Michael Ettner, also testified at trial. (Trial Tr., p.362, Ls.9-15.) He testified that 
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S.H. claimed to have been raped by the roommate of a friend of hers during this exam. 
(Trial Tr., p.368, Ls.7-15.} Dr. Ettnes also stated that S.H. physically appeared to be 
upset, had multiple bite marks present on her body, and had a "scant" amount of blood 
in her vaginal canal. (Trial Tr., p.368, L.20 p.372, L.1 0.} There was no other trauma 
noted with regard to S.H.'s vaginal area. (Trial Tr., p.371, Ls.14-22.) Additionally, the 
washings taken as part of the rape kit were negative for the presence of sperm. (Trial 
Tr., p.373, Ls.7-9.) With regard to the bite marks, the doctor testified that there was no 
blood on these marks, nor was there any broken skin. (Trial Tr., p.374, Ls.10-15.} 
Jennifer Wayman, an emergency room nurse who assisted with the rape kit 
performed on S.H., testified next. (Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.8-18.} Ms. Wayman testified that, 
in the course of assisting with the rape kit, she took several swabs of the bite marks that 
were on S.H.'s body. (Trial Tr., p.383, L.13 - p.384, L.19.) These swabs were collected 
and turned over to police for testing. (Trial Tr., p.384, L.20- p.388, L.18.) 
The State next called Rylene Nowlin to the stand. Ms. Nowlin is a forensic 
scientist at the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Laboratory. (Trial Tr., p.418, Ls.3-
11.} Ms. Nowlin testified that she is employed in the biology DNA3 unit, where her 
duties included examination of items in order to detect the presence of bodily fluids, and 
testing for DNA if bodily fluids have been identified. (Trial Tr., p.419, Ls.3-11.} In 
conjunction with her duties, Ms. Nowlin received and tested several items she had 
received from police in conjunction with this case. (Trial Tr., p.434, 13 - p.437, L. 18.} 
Ms. Nowlin testified that she only identified a single sperm head from all of the four 
vaginal swabs that were taken from S.H., and that this provided an insufficient sample 
of genetic material to support DNA testing. (Trial Tr., p.p.437, L.5 - p.438, L.6, p.444, 
3 Deoxyribonucleic acid. 
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Ls.16-22.) However, Ms. Nowlin testified that the swabs taken from the bite marks on 
S.H. indicated a mixed profile of genetic contributors and that Mr. Parmer could not be 
excluded as being one of the contributors. (Trial Tr., p.439, L.8 - p.443, L.22.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Nowlin testified that there was no way to determine 
the age of the sperm head that she believed she detected on one of the swabs taken 
from S.H. (Trial Tr., p.470, L.25 - p.471, L.10.) Likewise, she was unable to tell how it 
got to S.H. (Trial Tr., p.471, Ls.17-19.) Further, there were no cells of any type that 
Ms. Nowlin detected from the vaginal swabs of S.H. that showed any DNA foreign to 
S.H. (Trial Tr., p.472, Ls.12-14.) And none of the penile swabs taken from Mr. Parmer 
had any DNA foreign to him that was detected. (Trial Tr., p.477, Ls.1-7.) 
Following Ms. Nowlin's testimony, the State rested and Mr. Parmer called his first 
witness, Dr. Raymond Grimsbo. (Trial Tr., p.493, L.13; p.515, Ls.6-8.) Dr. Grimsbo is a 
forensic scientist at lntermountain Forensic Science. (Trial Tr., p.515, Ls.9-13.) In 
conjunction with his employment, Dr. Grimsbo is trained in the analysis of sexual 
assault kits, and was asked by Mr. Parmer to examine the sexual assault kit in this case 
to determine whether there was any sperm present on the materials taken from S.H. 
(Trial Tr., p.520, L.2 - p.521, L.13.) After receiving the slide upon which Ms. Nowlin 
believed she detected a sperm head, Dr. Grimsbo examined this slide to see if he could 
find and identify the sperm head. (Trial Tr., p.522, L.20 - p.523, L.6.) Dr. Grimsbo was 
not able to identify any sperm on the slide. (Trial Tr., p.523, Ls.7-13.) Accordingly, the 
doctor could neither confirm nor deny the presence of any sperm. (Trial Tr., p.525, 
Ls.6-9.) Dr. Grimsbo also testified that the finding of a single sperm head does not, of 
itself, show penile penetration to a scientific certainty. (Trial Tr., p.528, L.10 - p.529, 
L.8.) 
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The other witness presented by Mr. Parmer was Ms. Seeling. (Trial Tr., p.580, 
Ls.10-12.) Ms. Seeling testified that she was present on the night of the alleged rape, 
along with Mr. Parmer, S.H., and Mr. Bornschein. (Trial Tr., p.580, L.24 - p.581, L.4, 
p.583, Ls.18-24.) According to her testimony, Ms. Seeling invited S.H. to hang out 
earlier in the day. (Trial Tr., p.581, Ls.7-24.) Ms. Seeling and Mr. Parmer were drinking 
and dancing when S.H. came over sometime between ten and eleven o'clock that night. 
(Trial Tr., p.583, Ls.3-14.) 
Ms. Seeling testified that, while everyone was dancing in Ms. Seeling's basement 
bedroom, S.H. was kissing both her and Mr. Parmer. (Trial Tr., p.585, L.20 - p.586, 
L.13.) She also testified that Mr. Parmer bit both her and S.H. while they were dancing. 
(Trial Tr., p.589, L.22 - p.590, L.1.) Later that night, Ms. Seeling, S.H. and Mr. Parmer 
decided to hang out on a bed and talk. (Trial Tr., p.586, L.23 - p.588, L.7.) According 
to Ms. Seeling's testimony, S.H. placed her hand down both her and Mr. Parmer's 
pants. (Trial Tr., p.589, Ls.4-11.) Ms. Seeling did not believe that either she or 
Mr. Parmer were touching S.H. at this time. (Trial Tr., p.589, Ls.20-21.) 
Ms. Seeling testified that Mr. Parmer also bit S.H. again when the three of them 
were on her bed, and that S.H. stated that the bite hurt. (Trial Tr., p.590, Ls.15-22.) 
Ms. Seeling eventually fell asleep. (Trial Tr., p.591, Ls.19-21.) At some point, 
Ms. Seeling woke up and went to a nearby table to smoke a cigarette. (Trial Tr., p.592, 
Ls.7-22.) Ms. Seeling obseNed Mr. Parmer on top of S.H. when she went to have a 
cigarette. (Trial Tr., p.592, Ls.7-11.) Ms. Seeling testified that, when she finished her 
cigarette, she returned to bed, nudging Mr. Parmer and S.H. over to the side so that 
there was room for her to sleep. (Trial Tr., p.595, L.18 - p.596.) When Ms. Seeling 
asked S.H. to move over, S.H. told Ms. Seeling that she was scared. (Trial Tr., p.596, 
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Ls.8-12.) Ms. Seeling testified that she told S.H. that she should fall asleep and that 
S.H. would be okay. (Trial Tr., p.596, Ls.8-12.) She never heard S.H. say "no" or tell 
Mr. Parmer to stop that night, and Ms. Seeling further denied she ever told Mr. Parmer 
to leave S.H. alone. (Trial Tr., p.592, L.4 - p.593, L.13.) 
Ms. Seeling also testified that S.H. had already left when she woke up the next 
morning. (Trial Tr., p.597, Ls.13-19.) While Ms. Seeling attempted to text S.H. to see 
where she went, Ms. Seeling did not receive a reply from S.H. until later that morning 
when S.H. responded that she was at the hospital. (Trial Tr., p.597, Ls.13-19.) Close to 
the same time, police arrived at Ms. Seeling and Mr. Parmer's house. (Trial Tr., p.597, 
Ls.13-22.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Seeling admitted that she was friends with 
Mr. Parmer and that she had invited S.H. over that evening because Mr. Parmer 
expressed an interest in S.H. (Trial Tr., p.598, Ls.8-9; p.600, L.25 - p.601, L.6.) 
However, Ms. Seeling was having difficulty responding to some of the State's questions 
due to the fact that she could not recall some of the specifics of the night in question. 
(Trial Tr., p.605, Ls.12-13.) At the point where Ms. See ling expressed difficulty recalling 
the facts asked for, the State then provided Ms. Seeling with a transcript of a prior 
interview she participated in that was conducted by the prosecutor and police, expressly 
doing so on the basis of refreshing Ms. Seeling's recollection of some of her prior 
statements. (Trial Tr., p.605, Ls.12-25.) 
Despite having represented that the transcript of Ms. Seeling's prior, unsworn 
statement was only being offered to refresh Ms. Seeling's recollection, the prosecutor 
made multiple attempts to place the substance of these prior statements into evidence 
before the jury, over Mr. Parmer's objections. (Trial Tr., p.606, L.9 - p.614, L.2.) The 
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prosecutor likewise asked several questions that were deemed to be inadmissible as 
argumentative and inflammatory - and frequently repeated the same question or a 
virtually identical one following the district court's rulings sustaining Mr. Parmer's 
objections. (Trial Tr., p.611, L.15 - p.638, L.24.) Ultimately, the district court found it 
necessary to admonish the prosecutor for doing so. (Trial Tr., p.613, L.21 p.614, L.2, 
p.626, Ls.12-20; p.638, Ls.20-24.) 
Mr. Parmer elected not to testify at trial. (Trial Tr., p.644, L.1 - 646, L.3.) The 
jury acquitted Mr. Parmer of rape, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of 
battery with the intent to commit rape. (Trial Tr., p.708, Ls.3-11; R., pp.249-250.) 
Mr. Parmer was sentenced to 15 years, with six years fixed, upon his conviction of 
battery with the intent to commit rape. (Trial Tr., p.778, L.25 p.779, L.3; R., pp.302-
304.) The district court further retained jurisdiction over his case and subsequently 
placed Mr. Parmer on probation for a term of five years. (Trial Tr., p.778, L.25 - p.779, 
L.3; R., pp.302-304; Order Suspending Execution of Judgment and Sentence Following 
Retained Jurisdiction, Augment. 4) Mr. Parmer timely appeals from his judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
4 Mr. Parmer has sought to augment the record on appeal with copies of the minutes 
from the rider review hearing held in his case, as well as the district court's order placing 
him on probation, through a motion to augment the record that is filed 
contemporaneously with this brief. 
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ISSUE 
Did the prosecutor engage in a pattern of misconduct in cross-examination that requires 
reversal in this case? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Prosecutor Engaged In A Pattern Of Misconduct In Cross-Examination That 
Requires Reversal In This Case 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor in this case engaged in a pattern of cross-examination of 
Ms. Seeling wherein the prosecutor would ask improper questions of this witness and, 
upon receiving an adverse ruling from the district court as to the propriety of these 
questions, would deliberately repeat the same offending question before the jury. At 
times, the prosecutor would repeat the exact same question immediately after the 
district court sustained an objection to it. Mr. Parmer asserts that this pattern of 
disregarding the district court's rulings, seeking to place inadmissible evidence before 
the jury, and seeking to inflame the passions and prejudice of the jurors constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct that was not harmless either individually or collectively. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because Mr. Parmer objected to the alleged misconduct in this case, this Court 
applies a two-tiered standard of review to his claim on appeal. First, this Court 
examines whether misconduct occurred. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221-222, 225-
227 (2010). If this Court finds that there was prosecutorial misconduct in this case, then 
the State bears the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was 
harmless. Id. Prosecutorial misconduct cannot be deemed harmless by this Court 
unless this Court can declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Id. at 225-227. 
13 
C. The Prosecutor Engaged In A Pattern Of Misconduct In Cross-Examination That 
Requires Reversal In This Case 
"It is the primary and fundamental duty of the prosecuting attorney and his 
assistants to see that an accused receives a fair trial." State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 
353 (1973). In furtherance of this duty, a prosecutor must, "guard against anything that 
would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them from considering only 
the evidence introduced." State v. !twin, 9 Idaho 35, 44 (1903). The United States 
Supreme Court has delineated the contours of this duty as follows: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to 
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially 
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense 
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor 
- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not 
at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much a duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 75, 88 (1935). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has further defined the powers and duties of 
prosecutors in Idaho with regard to ensuring each defendant's right to a fair trial: 
Every person accused of a crime in Idaho has the right to a fair and 
impartial trial, whether guilty or innocent. We long ago held [i]t is the duty 
of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing 
but competent evidence is submitted to the jury. They should not exert 
their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of 
error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of 
the accused. Prosecutorial misconduct includes asking questions where 
the answer is inadmissible, but the jury can infer what the answer would 
have been simply from the question asked. 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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It constitutes prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to use inflammatory 
language in describing a witness or a defendant, to misrepresent or mischaracterize the 
evidence, or to appeal to the passions or prejudice of the jurors. See, e.g., State v. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86-87 (Ct App. 2007). It is also misconduct for a prosecutor to 
ignore a trial court's ruling sustaining an objection, and thereafter persist in the same 
type of questioning deemed to be inadmissible. See, State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 
53, 63 (2011 ); State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 683-684 (Ct. App. 201 O); State v. 
Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525-526 (Ct. App. 2001). "The court should not have to 
lecture the prosecutor in front of the jury in order to get its point across that the current 
line of questioning is inappropriate and the prosecutor should move on to a different 
one." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 63.5 
The instances of the prosecutor in this case flatly ignoring the district court's 
rulings regarding the impermissibility of his questions are both numerous and extensive. 
In the first instance of this misconduct, upon Ms. Seeling testifying that, at the 
time of trial, she lacked an independent recollection of whether S.H. appeared to be 
afraid when Mr. Parmer was on top of her even after reviewing her prior statement 
during an interview with the prosecutor, the prosecutor then asked, "Okay. So you were 
lying to myself and Mr. Kirkhart?" (Trial Tr., p.610, L.14 - p.611, L.17 (emphasis 
added.)) The district court sustained Mr. Parmer's objection to this argumentative and 
inflammatory question. (Trial Tr., p.611, Ls.18-19.) Rather than abide by the court's 
ruling and moving on to another subject matter, the prosecutor immediately followed suit 
with a question that was virtually identical to the one ruled inappropriate by the district 
5 This Court may wish to note that the prosecutor in this case was also the same 
prosecutor who was found to have committed misconduct in Ellington. 
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cou1i: "You were not telling the correct version of what happened when you spoke 
with Mr. Kirkhart and myself?" (Trial Tr., p.611, Ls.21-23 (emphasis added.)) At this 
point, Mr. Parmer both objected to this nearly identical question and requested that the 
district court admonish the prosecutor. (Trial Tr., p.611, L.25 - p.612, L.1.) The district 
court declined to admonish the prosecutor, but did again sustain the objection. (Trial 
Tr., p.612, L.2.) 
The prosecutor returned to his accusations that Ms. Seeling was lying a third 
time, accusing her of being untruthful in her trial testimony because she did not inform 
police on the morning following the alleged rape that S.H. had placed her hands down 
Ms. Seeling's pants. (Trial Tr., p.625, Ls.7-20.) As before, the district court sustained 
Mr. Parmer's objection to this question. (Trial Tr., p.625, Ls.21-23.) 
Very shortly after Mr. Parmer's third objection to this type of question was 
sustained, the prosecutor again asked a nearly identical question a fourth time. When 
Ms. Seeling stated her belief that she had informed the prosecutor of the sexual contact 
between her and S.H., the following exchange took place: 
MR. VERHAREN: Why would you lie to myself and Mr. Kirkhart? 
MR. CHAPMAN: Objection, your Honor, to the nature of the question. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CHAPMAN: I'd ask that you admonish counsel about this line of 
questioning, sir. 
THE COURT: Well, that's argumentative, Mr. Verharen. Rephrase 
your question, please. 
(Trial Tr., p.626, Ls.12-20.) 
These questions were all improper. The prosecutor in this case was accusing 
Ms. Seeling of lying at trial when, for most of these questions, she merely could not 
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remember the facts at issue; and also because the prosecutor's insinuations that 
Ms. Seeling was lying were calculated to inflame the passion and prejudice of the jury. 
Moreover, there is no meaningful distinction between the prosecutor's first question and 
his immediate follow up question, as "lying" and "not telling the correct version of what 
happened" are basically synonymous. See http://www. merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/lying (defining the term "lying" to mean "marked by or containing 
falsehoods) (last visited December 21, 2012). The third and fourth questions were 
likewise substantially the same as the question initially determined by the district court 
to have been inappropriate. Accordingly, the prosecutor in this case intentionally and 
repeatedly disregarded the district court's ruling that these questions were not 
permissible. 
In addition to this, the prosecutor asked Ms. Seeling twice whether Mr. Parmer 
removed S.H.'s pants, and each time Ms. Seeling responded that she did not know. 
(Trial Tr., p.614, L.20 - p.615, L.3.) After the prosecutor directed Ms. Seeling to a 
particular page of the transcript of her prior unsworn statement, and asking whether she 
then recalled whether Mr. Parmer removed S.H.'s pants, Ms. Seeling again reiterated 
that she did not remember and did not know. (Trial Tr., p.615, Ls.4-15.) Despite 
Ms. Seeling repeatedly answering that she did not know whether Mr. Parmer removed 
S.H.'s pants and did not recall her statement, the following exchange occurred: 
MR. VERHAREN: So at some point, you told somebody that you 
think Mr. Parmer ripped [S.H.'s] pants off of 
her? 
MR. CHAPMAN: Objection, your Honor. Lack of foundation, personal 
knowledge. 
THE COURT: Yeah, sustained. 
MR. VERHAREN: And he ripped those down to her ankles? 
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MR. CHAPMAN: Same objection, your Honor. This is asked and 
answered. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
(Trial Tr., p.615, Ls.16-25.) 
Prior to asking Ms. Seeling whether she has previously stated that Mr. Parmer 
had "ripped" S.H.'s pants off, the prosecutor was aware that she had no recollection of 
that statement, even having attempted to refresh her recollection with that prior 
statement. Accordingly, the prosecutor's initial question about this statement, in the 
face of Ms. Seeling's testimony that she did not recall the statement, was improper. 
More important, immediately following the district court's ruling that this question was 
not permissible, the prosecutor in this case merely continued in the exact same line of 
questioning - undeterred - in the face of the court's adverse ruling. Even if the 
prosecutor was unaware that his question was improper prior to the district court's 
adverse ruling, he certainly was made aware that this line of question was not permitted 
when the court sustained Mr. Parrner's objection. Rather than move on to a permissible 
line of questioning, however, the prosecutor merely elected to ignore the court's ruling. 
This was plainly misconduct. 
Finally, the prosecutor once again persisted in presenting questions deemed 
inadmissible by the court when he repeatedly questioned Ms. Seeling about whether 
she believed that the encounter between S.H. and Mr. Parmer was consensual in light 
of pictures taken of S.H.'s bite marks. This final exchange prompted the district court to 
give a far sterner admonition to the prosecutor that the court's prior warnings: 
MR. VERHAREN: This opinion that Mr. Chapman asked you about and 
that you gave us, you're giving us that opinion after 
looking at those bite marks on that girl's body? 
MR. CHAPMAN: Objection; argumentative your honor. 
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THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. VERHAREN: Well, how can you think that his advances were not 
unwanted when you look at these bite marks? 
MR. CHAPMAN: Objection; same objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Verharen, she'd testified as to her 
knowledge of these marks. The question did not refer 
to her opinion only but what was going on at the time. 
Sustained. Stay away from this. 
(Trial Tr., p.638, Ls.7-24.) 
The common thread in the pattern of misconduct in this case is that, not only 
were the State's questions clearly improper because they employed "inflammatory 
language seemingly calculated to arouse negative emotions," but the prosecutor in this 
case repeated the inflammatory questions on several occasions following the district 
court's rulings that these questions were inadmissible. See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87. 
This is not the type of case where the prosecutor could not be faulted for failing to 
anticipate the district court's evidentiary rulings regarding the permissibility of the 
prosecutor's questions, nor did the prosecutor in this case immediately abandon his 
improper questions and change course upon being made aware of their impropriety. 
Compare State v. Danson, 113 Idaho 746, 749-750 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Given the volume of the inappropriate questions, Mr. Parmer asked the district 
court twice to admonish the prosecutor regarding this misconduct. (Trial Tr., p.611, 
L.25 - p.612, L.1, p.626, Ls.12-20.) And the district court did, in fact, admonish the 
prosecutor for his improper questions three times during the course of the prosecutor's 
cross-examination of Ms. Seeling. (See Trial Tr., p.613, L.21 - p.614, L.2, p.626, Ls.12-
20, p.638, Ls.20-24.) 
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Mr. Parmer further asserts that, even if the individual acts of misconduct do not 
warrant reversal of his conviction individually, the repeated instances of misconduct -
when viewed in the aggregate - cannot be said to be harmless. "[TJhe cumulative error 
doctrine requires reversal of a conviction where there is 'an accumulation of 
irregularities, each of which by itself may be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors 
show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to 
due process."' State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-573 (2007) (quoting State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823 (1998)). Where a prosecutor asks multiple questions that 
individually are misconduct, this Court can review the aggregate effect of that 
misconduct under the cumulative error doctrine. State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 508 
(Ct. App. 2001 ). 
In sum, this is not a case where the prosecutor engaged in a small, isolated and 
fairly insignificant misstep with regards to remaining within the bounds of proper cross-
examination. Rather, the prosecutor in this case engaged in a protracted pattern of 
asking improper questions and then persisting in re-iterating these proscribed questions 
in the face of adverse rulings from the trial court. As put by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Berger, "we have not here a case where the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was 
slight or confined to a single instance, but one where such misconduct was pronounced 
and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be 
disregarded as inconsequential." Berger, 295 U.S. at 89. 
The prejudicial impact this misconduct had on Mr. Parmer's right to a fair trial is 
especially pronounced given the importance of Ms. Seeling's testimony to the defense. 
Because Mr. Parmer did not testify at trial, Ms. Seeling was the only other witness who 
testified before the jury who was there on the night of the alleged rape. By her own 
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testimony, she was present in the basement the entire time that S.H. and Mr. Parmer 
were on the bed together and did not observe anything that she believed to be non-
consensual contact between the two. Given this, the prosecutor's inappropriate 
questions and, in particular, his repeated assertions that Ms. Seeling was lying were 
especially harmful to Mr. Parmer's defense. Moreover, the State's evidence in this case 
was not overwhelming; and the jury's verdict itself reflected that the jury did not entirely 
accept the State's evidence in light of the fact that the jury acquitted Mr. Parmer of rape 
and only convicted him of the lesser included offense of battery with intent to commit 
rape. See State v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 74 (Ct. App. 2005). 
In light of the centrality of Ms. Seeling's testimony to this case, and the volume 
and flagrancy of the pattern of misconduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case, 
Mr. Parmer asserts that this misconduct was not harmless. Accordingly, he asks that 
this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence for battery with intent to 
commit rape. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Parmer respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and sentence for battery with the intent to commit rape, and remand his case for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 2012. 
NS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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